What’s striking about the Japanese experience is not that they had a boom, bubble - and then a bust - in investments and asset prices. All too many countries have experienced such economic cycles. Japanese growth was based on real innovation by companies that appeared to be well run and that built dominant global market share. The Japanese stock market crash of 1989-90 was followed by not one or two but by ‘three lost decades’ of stagnation in total GDP. This is a remarkable and daunting story with more than its share of policy mistakes along the way.

What are the lessons and for whom? Does what happened in Japan offer warnings to the US of the dangers of a massive tech boom? Or the potential consequences of not dealing head on with economic distress if it becomes widespread? So-called Zombie firms and banks became a big part of the 1990s Japanese financial landscape.

Might Japan offer a cautionary tale for China this decade and next? Japan’s economic boom - like China’s in the past three decades - was based on export-oriented manufacturing and a tech/led economy. The Japanese authorities felt compelled to revalue (ie., appreciate) their exchange rate in the mid-1980s, coincident with when they loosened credit too much - driving up real estate prices and contributing to a big over-expansion of plant and equipment.

Today, low growth expectations and projected rapid aging of the Japanese population may also be a forerunner of what’s to come in many industrial economies - at least anywhere that significantly limits net immigration. Japan’s experience suggests that if a country wants to become or remain one of the world’s leading economies, it needs to sustain productivity growth - and it also needs to: have enough working age population (relative to the number of retirees); make sure young people receive the education they need; and promote vibrant competitive markets, including with continued entry by new entrepreneurs.

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Overall, the U.S. economy is close to “full employment” and inflation has been consistently above the Fed’s 2% target. We’re experiencing multiple upward pressures on prices — including the Iran war energy price shock (see Episode 27: When Will the Iran War End?), the AI capital expenditure boom, decline in net immigration, and US tariff policies.

Ordinarily, in such a situation you would expect the Fed to “lean against the wind” by raising interest rates, possibly as early as the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) mid-September meeting announcement (Wednesday, September 16th). At their last meeting there was a split at the FOMC, with three members willing to vote for higher rates.

During our podcast, we review Fed Chair Kevin Warsh’s important speech at Jackson Hole, on the economy and conduct of monetary policy. For many years prior to rejoining the Fed, Chair Warsh argued for tighter monetary policy. But what will the FOMC led by Warsh do now — given that the President has repeatedly called for the Fed to lower interest rates?

If not in September, would the Fed raise rates at its next meeting in late October and risk being seen as influencing the mid-term elections then just one week away? Otherwise, does it wait for its last meeting of the year in December?

Inflation and the Federal Reserve are much on the markets (and our) minds these days. For a discussion on what the bond market may be saying about inflation you can also listen to Episode 26: What Is The Bond Market Saying? For our earlier episodes on the Fed you may also wish to listen to Episode 12: Big Challenges Facing The New Fed Chair and Episode Two: The Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy. Those substack posts also include recommendations for further reading.

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Listen to ‘Sustainability Currents: Gary Gensler on the Role of the SEC’ to hear Gary Gensler, former SEC Chair, share his views on how the SEC balances its three part mission--investor protection, capital formation, and fair, orderly, and efficient markets? How should the SEC weigh investor demands for disclosures against the cost to public filers? What were the investor benefits for climate risk disclosure rules? Do quarterly earnings reports drive market efficiency, or trading volatility? How do recent Supreme Court Rulings impact SEC activities?

You also can listen on Apple, Spotify or where ever you listen to Bloomberg podcasts.

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Beginning six months ago with the US-Israeli February 28th attacks, the impact has been felt both across the Middle East — in local destruction, thousands of casualties, and heightened insecurity — as well as globally in energy markets, food prices, supply chains, strained alliances, and much more.

While all wars end, eventually, what are the odds that the fighting (and substantial closure of the Strait of Hormuz) will be over in the foreseeable future?

As the conflict was just getting started in March, we discussed the Iran war in our Episode Three: Economic Impacts of the Iran Conflict. At that time we expressed concern that both sides might dig in, literally and metaphorically. Since then, while the most violent part of the conflict seems to have receded, the US has failed to achieve its stated strategic goals — Iran still has its enhanced uranium stockpiles, the Strait Hormuz is still largely closed, and missiles and drones are still real threats with strikes exchanged yet again yesterday. Further, the entire Gulf region has been dragged into the conflict.

On both sides, political leaders may feel that time is on their side. Although there’s been tremendous destruction, death, and economic hardship in Iran, the US has failed to extract firm commitments from the new leadership there. In the US, gasoline and diesel prices remain high as midterm elections approach. Will Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s declaration of an “Economic D-Day” make much difference? Or as Marc Lynch writes in his recent Foreign Affairs article, will the current Iran conflict be ‘The End of the American Middle East’?

Simon and Amir Kermani wrote about how to resolve the US-Iran conflict in May, “Is A Lasting US-Iran Deal Now Possible? Overcoming Time Inconsistency and Political Debt Overhang,” CEPR Policy Insight 150.

In our third episode, Gary mentioned “The Arrogance of Power,” an important speech delivered on May 5, 1966, by Senator J. William Fulbright, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959-1975. Links available: original documents, or a complete printed version as reported by U.S. News and World Report.

Gary also continues to recommend Philip Gordon’s book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, published October 2020. Or take a look at Philip’s essay in Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2020: “The False Promise of Regime Change: Why Washington Keeps Failing in the Middle East.”

Join us next week when we will discuss, “Does the Fed have inflation under control?”

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Listen to former SEC Chair and CFTC Chair Gary Gensler discuss yesterday’s 9th Circuit Kalshi vs. Assad Opinion which unanimously ruled against Kalshi and in favor of the State of Nevada.

At issue in the dispute is whether Congress while passing 2010’s Dodd-Frank financial reform laws after the 2008 financial crisis made the CFTC a nationwide sports betting regulator. Kalshi (and the current CFTC) contend that Congress made the CFTC a nationwide sports betting regulator and denied states their traditional police power to regulate gaming, including sports betting. The 9th Circuit, on a preliminary motions hearing, decided otherwise.

Gary agrees with the 9th Circuit that Congress did nothing of the sort. In June, he filed an Amicus in Kalshi vs. Schuler in the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the case between Kalshi, Ohio, and Tennessee saying that Congress had not preempted the application of state gaming laws.

The 9th Circuit opinion in Nevada further tees things up for the Supreme Court to possibly weigh in on the matter. Earlier this year, in a split decision out of New Jersey, 3th Circuit Kalshiex vs. Flaherty Opinion, that court sided the other way.

You also can listen to Gary & Simon discuss Prediction Markets in ‘Episode Five: Prediction Markets’

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Former SEC and CFTC Chair Gary Gensler discusses today’s reports on another dust up between traditional exchanges and prediction markets. Bloomberg reported today that prediction market Kalshi asked the SEC to delay the listing of competing products on a traditional exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). This, even as the contracts Kalshi reportedly asked to be delayed are options contracts specifically tied to line items in public company corporate earnings reports.

Fmr. SEC Chair Gary Gensler talks conflict between prediction markets and traditional exchanges 5.27

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Power and Consequences will continue to be for those seeking to understand the ground truths of today’s power and policy debates. We dedicate each episode to a single policy topic, drawing on historical context to explain how the events of today will affect you tomorrow. In our first 26 episodes, we’ve covered AI, the Federal Reserve, the US Dollar, the Bond Market, Government Debt, Taxes, Trade, Immigration, Industrial Policy, Science Funding, the Rule of Law, the Supreme Court, Prediction Markets, Private Credit, Mega IPOs, the Business of Space, China, Cuba, Greenland, and the Iran War.

Here’s Episode 26 now on YouTube: What is the Bond Market Saying?

Listen to (or watch below) our short YouTube introduction, in which we discuss our backgrounds and explain how we intend to move forward with video podcasting.

Power & Consequences Now On YouTube 5:06

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At one level, the basics are simple and incontrovertible: investors are only willing to hold 10- or 30-year US Treasury securities if they receive more compensation (that’s the interest rate) to offset what they now see as the higher risk involved. But how much of this repricing of risk is due to a normalization of rates after many years of Federal Reserve policies holding down long-term rates? How much is due to concerns about longer term inflation, the US fiscal picture (e.g., federal budget deficits around 6% of GDP), or high borrowing demands of the AI-oriented investment boom (i.e., large-scale issue of bonds by tech companies)?

We take listeners through the basics and explain the jargon. We also demystify some of the discussion currently swirling. We then walk through the economics and politics of recent moves by the US Treasury Secretary attempting to limit interest rate increases.

There remains a genuine debate: are yields rising as part of a normalization of interest rates after a very low period of artificially low rates? Or do global markets sense that fiscal policy in industrial economies is not under control - and that the political will to make adjustments is nowhere (yet) to be seen?

Here are a couple of historical items that provide more background on some of the experiences we discuss.

How monetary policy operated immediately before the modern era: ‘Yield Curve Control in the United States, 1942 to 1951’, by Jonathan Rose, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives, No. 2, October 2021.

The Kennedy Administration’s effort to influence the yield curve: ‘Operation Twist and the Effect of Large-Scale Asset Purchases’, by Titan Alon and Eric Swanson, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, FRBSF Economic Letter 2011-13, April 25, 2011.

This March 2020 (COVID-times) speech by Lael Brainard on yield curve control.

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Both of us teach (different but related) courses on the economics of AI at MIT — and have been doing so for many years. In these classroom discussions, as in the broader public discourse, there are multiple issues to consider. What tasks within jobs will be most readily replaced by AI? Will AI largely automate generic tasks or also replace expert skills for which workers currently receive premium wages? How will AI affect demand for labor in specific sectors, at individual companies, and between countries? What new jobs or sectors will be created? What will happen to public finances? Many of these issues come down to what tasks will be replaced by algorithms and who will keep a job (or get a better job).

With only early evidence and hints about AI’s effects on the overall labor markets, a set of hard questions arise for policy makers: are there ways to put AI development onto a path that would create more good jobs for more people?

This is a matter for serious debate across the US and other industrial nations, such as Western Europe. It may be even more challenging for middle- and lower-income countries which have less scientific basis for innovation and fewer fiscal resources to use to buffer whatever labor market transition lies ahead. Further, poorer countries may find themselves hard pressed if they lose good jobs at the same time as their corporate sectors come under intense pressure — for example, if the US and China maintain their leads in AI development and deployment.

Gary has spoken and written extensively about how AI, including its impact on finance, investing, and work: “It really took Henry Ford about 25 years to figure out: ‘Let’s re-envision the factory floor.’ ... I think there’s a lot of re-envisioning that’s going to need to go on.”

In Power and Progress: Our 1000-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, Simon and Daron Acemoglu wrote about the history of technology and why it does not always deliver benefits for everyone. While AI could create a bonanza that supports shared prosperity, there are reasons to be concerned that this is not the path we are on. To address these concerns, Simon, Daron Acemoglu and David Autor have proposed what they call “Pro-Worker AI.”

The British government is currently running a Pro-Worker AI Adoption prize, “recognising organisations using AI that benefits workers.” Simon is chair of the prize committee.

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Gary discusses America’s massive investment boom in AI with popular author and podcaster Stephen Dubner.

What does it mean for financial markets, the economy, and you? What happens when the current boom in AI capital expenditures plateaus or declines? The long history of general purpose technology investment booms — from canals and railroads in the 19th century, to electricity, computerization and the Internet in the 20th century — suggest that retrenchments are likely.

When that occurs, what disruptions may be in the financial markets and your future? As Gary says in the podcast: ‘Something has to give.’

Listen to the full interview here to find out more: ‘He Helped Clean Up the Last Crash. Does He See Another One Coming?’ 66:59

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This might seem like a strange question to ask in the age of AI, amidst grandiose promises/dreams for what advanced technology could deliver — along with growing fears about what too much innovation (or the wrong kind of vision or just a lot of data centers) might bring. And the Trump Administration is promising a golden age of science. But, at the same time, universities are being squeezed financially, PhD admissions at top schools (like MIT) are down, and there are big political fights ongoing about the scale and direction of funding for basic research.

The U.S. federal government used to spend a lot more on R&D as a percent of GDP than it does now. Should we go back to that level of commitment? Or should we rely on the private sector to lead the way in creating new scientific ideas? What do we lose (or gain) when the profit motive predominates in this space? And are we in some way undermining our American advantages (including for commerce and national security) under the Trump Plan for science?

Here’s a relevant speech by Gary, to the National Press Club, in July 2023: “Isaac Newton to AI”, including these lines: “AI is going to continue significantly transforming science, technology, and commerce. I suspect Newton, though, would agree that it is important to focus on the micro and macro challenges of AI. Given that we’re dealing with automation of human intelligence, the gravity of these challenges is real.”

Simon’s two books related to this topic.

Jump-Starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream, by Simon and Jonathan Gruber. Published in 2019, argues for big investments in U.S. science, spreading this around the country, and creating an “innovation dividend” shared with everyone. This is the best way to create more good jobs today.

Power and Progress: Our 1000-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity, by Simon and Daron Acemoglu. Published in 2023, shows that technological “progress” does NOT always help everyone, even if it boosts productivity; shared prosperity requires specific conditions – which are achievable in the age of AI, in principle, but this is not the course that most countries are currently on.

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This global system sometimes seems so stable and so much part of our modern world that is easy to imagine it as immutable. But if we look back 100 years, the world’s monetary and financial system was quite different - the dollar played a role in international transactions but not with the same importance as today. And if we examine carefully how the world’s financial system worked during the heyday of the Bretton Woods system, from the 1940s to the early 1970s, the dollar was regarded as an anchor but not like today.

It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that the global system will continue to evolve. Looking forward, will the dollar become more important, because the world is seen as unstable and investors (and central banks) value a “safe asset”. Or will the dollar soon be eclipsed, for example because the U.S. proves unable to get its fiscal house in order? And if the dollar does fall from grace, what asset or assets are likely to take its place?

If you would like to read further on this topic, you could start with this 2023 speech by Gary Gensler, “Exorbitant Privilege: Responsibilities and Challenges,” which emphasizes the role of investor protection in maintaining the global role of the dollar.

Also see these three essays from the CEPR Report, The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration:

“The Financial Sector and Global Dollar System,” by Gary Gensler, Lev Menand, and Joshua Younger.

“Dollar Dominance and the Trump Administration,” by Steven Kamin.

“The Global Public Good,” by Barry Eichengreen.

If you’d like more historical background on the remarkable rise, fall, and rise again of the U.S. dollar, see “The End of Gold,” Chapter 2 in White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why it Matters to You, by Simon Johnson and James Kwak.

For the first 200 years of US history, while we had a long history of borrowing to finance our way through crises (particularly wars), the goal was to pay down that debt once circumstances were more favorable (i.e., during peacetime). Over the last 25 years, though, this no longer has been the case. Since 2001, publicly held US government debt has increased steadily in both good economic times and during difficult times. It now weighs in at 100% of GDP — the highest since just after WWII, tripling from just 32% of GDP in 2001.

Much has happened during this time to shift fiscal policy and results — multiple tax cuts during the Bush and two Tump administrations, the 2008 financial crisis, COVID 19 pandemic, multiple US engagement in wars, and an aging population. For many of these years, particularly after the financial crisis, the US Federal Reserve also pursued monetary policies which kept Treasury borrowing costs close to zero.

While rating agencies have downgraded US debt, to date domestic and global investors have continued to readily buy the vast supply of newly issued Treasury debt. But how long will this last?

In the last four years as inflation returned, interest rates on government debt rose. Further, regardless of administration rhetoric, deficits have continued to run annually at about 6% of GDP.

What would it take to boost revenue or lower spending to balance the US fiscal picture? Though there are alternatives to raise taxes or cut spending, there has not been a ready political path forward to do so, particularly as 2/3rds of spending is mandatory spending, including for social security and Medicare. If we can boost economic growth significantly, perhaps our fiscal picture will take care of itself — but is that truly a realistic possibility?

Simon and James Kwak published a book on US fiscal questions: White House Burning (a reference to the war of 1812). For a more recent take, see also Fiscal Policy and Debt Sustainability by Antonio Fatas and Ugo Panizza, published in a CEPR volume last year (which Gary and Simon helped edit).

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Following up on our Episode Ten: Why Does the Rule of Law Matter?, we focus on how the Court’s recent decisions impact American institutions. Has the rule of law been strengthened or undermined? Is democratic participation likely to become more or less inclusive?

Many of the term’s decisions are likely to have profound economic consequences, including:

• Expanding Presidential power by allowing presidents to fire members of agency boards and commissions; while preserving, for now, some independence for monetary policy. For more see 'Presidential Supremacy Over Administrative Agencies' written by Gary and Lev Menand (CEPR Press) last December in anticipation of such a ruling.

• Ruling against an executive order that sought to end birthright citizenship, while allowing in other immigration related decisions: a) presidents to end individual’s temporary protected status, b) asylum seekers to be turned back at the border, and c) green card holders to be denied readmission to the U.S. without the need to show ‘clear & convincing’ evidence of crimes.

• Removing limits on coordinated political campaign finance and making it harder to claim Congressional maps violate the Voting Rights Act.

• Ruling against the President on the use of a fifty year old emergency law to impose tariffs (one of the key components to justify the tariffs initially imposed in 2025)

It’s often said that the Supreme Court is a never ending constitutional convention, albeit whose nine members have lifetime appointments. Does the composition and inclination of the US’s current rolling ‘Constitutional Convention’ suggest that we are in a period of weakening institutions — compared to what has previously prevailed? Or is today’s Supreme Court a reminder that US institutions remain robust, with effective limits on executive power in modern America? Listen to this week’s episode to hear Gary & Simon’s take on these important questions.

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The US may currently lead in large language models, chip design, and data center funding, but China has impressive computer science capabilities, leads in robotics, and its large language model (LLM) performance generally measures only months behind the US. China’s greater emphasis on ‘open-weight’ models also may be an effort to promote faster global adoption and diffusion of their models.

Europe, the UK, Japan, India, Mideast nations, and the rest of the world, though, aren’t sitting by idly. Each country seeks to establish some scope of AI sovereignty to exert control over their own economy and national security — as Gary and former US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discussed in ‘AI & The Future of Sovereignty’.

How much will countries without their own LLMs or data centers, though, have choices about what models to use? Might the rest of the world see a significant portion of AI’s economic benefit accrue to the US and China? If imbalances persist, what might be the geo-political consequences? Might the world find that the US or China use AI economic leverage to influence other countries’ geo-political decisions? As AI continues to change weaponry, how will it shift strategic balances?

As discussed in Episode 13: Can AI Behave Responsibly?, there also are differing policy approaches around the globe to AI. The European Union has adopted a relatively more restrictive approach to release and use of AI models. The US to date has been more permissive.

AI also presents significant labor market economic policy choices. We’ll consider in a future episode what might be the net effect on employment & wages — and which countries might do better or worse in this regard? Reflecting on China, what does their big push on robotics mean for all their people looking to find a good job?

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Gary Gensler discusses recent big tech fund raising activity including this week’s largest ever foreign US IPO — the $26.5 billion raised by Korean memory chip company SK Hynix. This followed on the heels of Google’s $85 billion share sale and SpaceX’s IPO at a $1.8 trillion valuation. What does this tell us about the current AI investment boom? Might it be a sign about market valuations?

Watch Bloomberg’s full interview here to find out more: Gensler: Big Deals a Sign of ‘High-Valuation Market’

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Currently, it’s advantage USA for large language models, though China also is doing very well. The US leads in computational power dedicated to AI due in large part to its advances in chip design, export controls, financial markets, and significant investment in data centers. The US model companies generally emphasize so-called ‘close weight’ models keeping proprietary the parameters to their algorithms. Chinese companies have led on ‘open-weight’ models which may advantage adoption diffusion.

China has demonstrated significant capabilities in AI computer science and has shown impressive advances in closing the AI performance gap with the US. With its size, political system, sensor-based economy, and social credit system, China also has greater access to personal data than any other country.

There are also many other important components of the AI technology stack and global competition beyond the LLM models themselves. Other niches — very profitable niches — are occupied by others — for instance for high bandwidth memory, lithography, and semiconductor fabrication labs.

Surely each country will wish to establish some scope of AI sovereignty, as well as adopting AI to fit their strategic needs, exerting control over their own economy and mitigating trade-offs between efficiency and AI supply chain resiliency. There also will be desires to develop applications that fit local conditions, particularly in countries very different (in income, culture, other features) from the US or China.

For further information listen to Gary’s fireside chat ‘AI & The Future of Sovereignty’ with former US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan or read ‘AI Sovereignty Is About Options, Not Ownership’ by Ren Ito or ‘Is AI sovereignty possible?’ by a Brookings team earlier this year.

We also recommend the recently published Priority Technologies, edited by Elisabeth Reynolds.

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Gary Gensler and former U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explore AI and the future of sovereignty during this fireside chat moderated by Google’s Kate Charlet at the recent International Association of Privacy Professionals Navigate 2026 Digital Policy Leadership Summit with the. talk below & here: IAPP Navigate 2026 keynote panel: Kate Charlet, Gary Gensler and Jake Sullivan.

Gary and Jake have worked together multiple times - on presidential campaigns and while serving in the U.S. Government. Jake Sullivan is now a Professor of the Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School where he teaches ‘The Policy and Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence’. He also is a Senior Fellow at the Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of New Hampshire and co-hosts The Long Game podcast.

For more, tune in for Gary & Simon’s upcoming: Episode 19: Who is Winning the AI Geo Competition (July 6) & Episode 20: What are the consequences of the AI race? (July 13)

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We discuss three pivotal figures in American technological history while interweaving what the Constitution’s ‘We the People’ has meant to the nation over these 250 years.

Eli Whitney, Henry Ford, and Vannevar Bush represented important technological visions that shaped products, processes, and societal changes over long periods of time. For Whitney, this was through the cotton gin and his efforts to develop a system of interchangeable parts. For Ford, the impact was through creating moving production lines, bringing electricity to those lines, and imagining that the Model T could become affordable for much of the middle class. For Bush, it was through the simple idea that a nation investing in science helps build capacity in many ways essential both to national emergencies and to long term growth.

The American democratic experiment, though, also has been marked by many inequities and internal struggles. At our founding, power, opportunity, and economic rewards clearly did not live up to the Declaration of Independence’s ideals ‘that all men are created equal’ (nor for women). Through many ups and downs over the years, the US has made much progress — on who belongs, how we govern, and who gets to participate in economic, political, and civic life.

Each of Whitney, Ford, and Bush’s legacies — like our nation — are not without their darker sides. Whitney’s inventions had a serious negative impact on enslaved people and Ford was well known for his antisemitism. Bush helped open the door to meritocracy, but also may have contributed to an overly elite-oriented system.

So what’s next for the USA? How will AI, this era’s transformative technology, affect society and inequalities? There are grounds for optimism that we could find ourselves on a more inclusive path, but history also suggests there are reasons for concern.

For a closer look at Eli Whitney and Henry Ford, warts and all, turn to Simon’s 2023 book with Daron Acemoglu, Power and Progress: Our Thousand Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. For more on Vannevar Bush, see Simon’s 2019 book, Jump-Starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream, with Jonathan Gruber.

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Gary Gensler Talks AI Hype, IPO Outlook | Bloomberg Talks 13:20

Or watch AI is Most Transformative Technology of our Time, Bloomberg’s short video version. 7:30

Former SEC Chair Gary Gensler says AI models and hyperscalers need to generate meaningful revenue and productivity gains to meet current market expectations. Gary also highlights that as pre-IPO investors consider selling their shares in high-priced Mega IPOs such as SpaceX, it could create downward pressure on the capital markets as well.

You can also listen to Gary & Simon discuss Mega IPOs in Episode 17: What do Mega IPOs Mean for Markets?

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